JAPANESE FAMILY PRESENCE & FIRM PERFORMANCE IN THE DIGITAL ERA An empirical research by Trinh Mai Phuong
  
<MBA Degree Thesis> 
AY 2018 
 
JAPANESE FAMILY PRESENCE & FIRM PERFORMANCE 
IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
An empirical research 
 
57160528-6  TRINH MAI PHUONG 
ORGANIZATION AND INFORMATION 
C.E. PROF. HIRANO, MASAAKI 
D.E. PROF. ASABA, SHIGERU   D.E. PROF. KANNO, HIROSHI 
 
 
Summary 
 
      In this study the effect of family control on firm profitability is examined using a sample of 
1,492 Japanese public companies during 2011-2016. The paper also assesses the possible forms of 
family involvement in businesses such as ownership and management, which may contribute to the 
difference in accounting performance between family and nonfamily firms, employing multivariate 
OLS regression methodology. 
      Findings indicate that family-run businesses, on average, generate higher returns than do publicly 
owned enterprises. Furthermore, a positive significant linear association exists between family 
ownership and firm performance regarding profitability. Additional examination of family firms 
suggests superior performance when family members rather than outsiders serve as CEOs. Besides, 
the digital era, to some extent, has already shown some significant effect on profitability of both 
types of businesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
<Inside Cover> 
 
JAPANESE FAMILY PRESENCE & FIRM PERFORMANCE 
IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
An empirical research 
 
57160528-6  TRINH MAI PHUONG 
ORGANIZATION AND INFORMATION 
C.E. PROF. HIRANO, MASAAKI 
D.E. PROF. ASABA, SHIGERU   D.E. PROF. KANNO, HIROSHI 
 
 
i 
 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES .................................... 5 
Section 1. DEFINITION OF FAMILY BUSINESSES ........................................................ 5 
Section 2. FAMILY INVOLVEMENT AND FIRM PERFORMANCE .................................. 7 
Subsection 1. Family Involvement in Ownership .................................................... 9 
Subsection 2. Family Involvement in Management ............................................... 10 
CHAPTER 3. DATA AND VARIABLES .................................................................... 12 
Section 1. DATA – SAMPLE COLLECTION ............................................................... 12 
Section 2. VARIABLES DESCRIPTION ...................................................................... 13 
Subsection 1. Dependent Variable ......................................................................... 13 
Subsection 2. Control Variables ............................................................................. 13 
Subsection 3. Explanatory Variables...................................................................... 15 
Section 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND OTHER UNIVARIATE RESULTS ................... 16 
Subsection 1. Summary Statistics .......................................................................... 16 
Subsection 2. Other Univariate Results .................................................................. 18 
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ......................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION .......................................................... 23 
Section 1. Multivariate results ............................................................................... 23 
Section 2. Robustness checks ................................................................................ 27 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 30 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 32 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 34 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
For over 1,000 years, Japan has been the home of family businesses (FBs), including the world 
oldest hotel, Nisiyama Onsen Keiunkan, which has been operating since 705 AD, and the world 
oldest sake brewery, Sudo Honke, which is now already in its 55
th
 generation.  The most surprising 
fact, however, does not come from those Guinness World Records but from the overall longevity of 
family-owned corporations in the land of the rising sun. The average lifespan of Japanese FBs was 
52 years (Goto, 2005), while other foreign counterparts in Silicon Valley and Europe only last at best 
for more than a decade. 
Having survived and even thriven through many economic fluctuations and sophisticated 
societies, family firms should hold some unique qualities to prolong their dynasties for dozen 
generations. Compared to typical large publicly owned businesses, FBs appear to suffer less from the 
agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Ultimately, the principal and agent in a family company share at least one common objective of 
maximizing the family’s well-being. Moreover, nonfamily managers are usually shorter-term 
oriented to take the most advantage of their tenure of office. Meanwhile, family executives are likely 
to follow long-term perspectives (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), pursuing strategies and 
investments over longer time horizons to benefit not only their current family members but also their 
future offspring. Thanks to the long-term insights and desire for control preservation, FBs also seem 
to be more prepared and stable than nonfamily businesses (NFBs) when facing economic downturns. 
Under short-run market pressure, family firms show consistent and solid investment behavior, which 
has been termed “patient investment” in Asaba’s research (2012). 
On the downside, the classic issue of family-owned enterprises often relates to succession. Given 
52-year average lifetime and 28-year average CEO tenure, most Japanese FBs collapse by or near 
the time their founders’ grandchildren take control (Goto, 2014). In many cases, successors cannot 
match either their founder’s entrepreneurial mindset or attitude towards risks. However, the third-
generation curse does not imply that lacking a gifted son or grandson should be the only cause of a 
dwindling FB. On one hand, FBs’ very nature already makes it harder for their heirs to succeed. Due 
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to the extended management tenure, descendants usually cope with a big gap in the business 
environments between two generations. On the other hand, wealth dilution is bound to happen as 
legacies received by family successors are subject to Japanese inheritance and gift tax at a very high 
rate of 55% and required to be paid in cash (Inheritance Tax Act, Act No. 73 of 1950). Recently, by 
passing the Reform Act of 2017, Japanese government makes tax avoidance by moving abroad even 
more difficult for family firms. The large tax bills, together with the yearning for continuity, may 
well explain why FBs in Japan tend to retain conservative balance sheets and restrain external 
financing, even at the cost of shrinking investment opportunities and deterring growth. 
In many ways, directing a family-run business has never been such a challenge. Currently, beside 
the prevailing threats derived from Japanese matured economic growth and serious competition 
posed by Chinese imports and globalization, the rise of new paradigms is defying FBs’ 
sustainability. Emerging technology breakthroughs have boosted the pace of knowledge creation, 
allowing more rapid and efficient adaptation to the increasingly fast-changing surrounding 
environment (Doukidis, Mylonopoulos & Pouloudi, 2004). AI (artificial intelligence), IoT (the 
Internet of Things), cognitive robotics, 3D printing and self-operating machines (cars, drones…) are 
quickly embedded in every facet of modern society, signaling the arrival of the Digital Era, or 
commonly referred as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Similar to any other technological 
transformations, the fourth wave promises vast potentials for creating values and fostering growth, 
awards those who take the initiative to provide the world with solutions and eliminates those who lag 
behind.  In this new world, digital talents, implementation of disruptive innovations, entrepreneurial 
viewpoint and effective change management will play a key role in improving sustainability and 
shaping future success of businesses. Confronting such transitions, would FBs rather keep their tight 
balance sheets and get stuck in the cycle of price competition or be willing to take risks and make 
room for new innovative ideas and experiments to develop their unique market offerings? Would 
their owners’ remarkable long-term insights and deep industry knowledge once again help them 
effectively allocate their scarce resources to remain current and drive their own prosperity in the 
digital era or would their long-tenured management result in rigidity and hinder change efforts? 
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Would next-generation family leaders afford the entrepreneurial energy and skills needed to execute 
any desired changes? Overall, would family companies generally be better at innovating and more 
profitable than widely held companies under the effects of technological disruptions?  
Existing literature has already considered the differences in economic performance between 
family-managed and publicly held businesses. Many studies have acquired statistical proof that FBs 
outperform NFBs with regards to profitability in different countries (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Lee, 
2006; Allouche et al., 2008). Few have recorded no significant difference (Binder Hamlyn, 1994). 
Meanwhile, some scholars have observed that NFBs receive better stock market reaction than FBs in 
response to special events such as innovation announcements (Chang, Wu & Wong, 2010). 
Furthermore, Anderson & Reeb (2003) argue that firm performance improves when family members 
rather than outsiders serve as CEOs, while Miller et al. (2014) reveals that nonfamily CEOs can 
promote superior performance under certain circumstances. Research to date also reveals 
inconsistent results when comparing the performance of founder-controlled and descendant-
controlled family firms (McConaughy & Phillips, 1999; Andres, 2008).  
Despite the large pool of research on FBs’ financial outcome versus NFBs’ as aforementioned, 
the findings are mixed and the data are rather outdated when considering the possible impacts of the 
digital era. Therefore, in this paper, I reinvestigate the financial performance of both FBs and NFBs, 
in particular, their profitability, using a sample of 1,492 public-listed companies in Japan from 2011 
to 2016. The primary objectives of my study are to: 
1. test whether a disparity in profitability exists between family-owned firms and publicly quoted 
corporations under the influence of the fourth wave, while controlling specific features relevant 
to both types of businesses, 
2. explore the determinants explaining the gap such as a factor that is absent in NFBs but potentially 
influences FBs and a factor that supports or hinders the performance of both, assuming all other 
things equal, 
3. compare the profitability of FBs managed by family founder, descendant and nonfamily CEOs.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first, some previous literature on family 
4 
 
businesses is briefly discussed in Chapter 2. Also discussed in the same chapter are the hypotheses 
examined in the study. Next, data and variables description are presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
clarifies the research methodology, in particular, multivariate regression analyses. Chapter 5 reports 
the research findings including multivariate results along with robustness checks. Finally, Chapter 6 
concludes the paper.    
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Section 1. DEFINITION OF FAMILY BUSINESSES 
      Over many decades, there is still no generally acknowledged definition of family business. 
Researchers usually define family business with reference to their own research’s purposes, thus, it 
is difficult if not impossible to compare their quantitative statistical evidence. A variety of 
definitions have been proposed. Anderson & Reeb (2003) identifies a business as family-controlled 
if the founding family owns any fraction of its equity ownership and/or any family member is 
present on the board of directors. Rather similarly, Lee (2006) bases his definition on shares held by 
the founder family members or descendants, or their presence on the supervisory board. According 
to Westhead & Howorth (2006), if the firm is considered a family business by its CEO/managing 
director/chairman and 50% of its ordinary voting shares belong to members of the largest single 
family group related by blood or marriage, it is family-run. Another definition requires a firm to 
meet at least one of the following conditions to be regarded as a family business: 1. 25% of the 
voting shares are kept by the founder and/or family members; 2. if the founding family holds less 
than 25% of the voting rights, its members must be executives or part of the board (Andres, 2008). 
Though a common definition is absent, most authors describe family businesses focusing on family 
involvement, the most unique characteristic that distinguishes family from nonfamily firms.   
 The lack of consensus on defining family businesses worldwide reflects that perhaps there should 
not be a general definition because of the variations in ownership structure, corporate governance 
system and legal regulation across countries. However, each country may have its own definition of 
family business. Therefore, in this study, the definition of family business will be built up to fit 
Japan’s specific features. 
 From legal perspective, in accordance with the Companies Act of Japan (Act No. 86 of 26 July, 
2005), at least a majority of voting rights present (more than 50%) are required for an ordinary 
resolution to be passed unless the company’s articles of incorporation indicates otherwise. Examples 
of ordinary resolutions are electing or removing directors or proposing the board to pursue a 
particular course of action.  Nonetheless, only one third of the votes cast are needed to veto an 
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ordinary or even a special resolution, which calls for at least two thirds of the votes cast by 
shareholders to pass. Hence, it is sufficient to set the threshold of shares owned by family 
stockholders at at least one third for their family to effectively control a business in Japan.  
From historical perspective, family-controlled conglomerates, often called “zaibatsus”, once 
dominated Japanese economy before the World War II. The most successful zaibatsus, commonly 
known as the “Big Four”, consisted of Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Yasuda. Nevertheless, 
after the end of the World War II, the “Big Four”, together with other “second-tier” zaibatsus were 
accused of having financed the militarists and acquired enormous monopolistic power by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). As a result, Washington requested the 
zaibatsus to dissolve themselves voluntarily. Afterwards, 325 companies were listed and dismantled 
in 1948.  Only some families managed to conceal a small fraction of their shares as their loyal 
employees purchased the stocks to subsequently sell back to them. Eventually, ownership of the 
zaibatsus’ shares mainly passed to individuals and financial groups, rather than belonged to a single 
family (Takemae, 2002; Addicott, 2017). From the history, it is reasonable if companies with more 
than 20% family ownership in Japan are not large in number if not quite rare.  
From statistical perspective, data also support the aforementioned statement. As stated by 
Claessens et al. (2000), out of 1,240 publicly traded companies in Japan, 13.1% were ran by families 
with a shareholding benchmark of 10% and only 9.7% were ran by families with a shareholding 
benchmark of 20%. As these data started from 1996 fiscal year and were retrieved primarily from 
the Worldscope 1998 database, family ownership in Japan appeared to range from 10% to 20% over 
a decade before the beginning of the digital era in 2011.  
Combining all of the aspects mentioned above, a 25% shareholding cut-off level will be chosen 
to classify family and nonfamily public enterprises in this study. Though 25% is a more conservative 
cut-off than the 20% shareholding benchmark used by Claessens et al. (2000), it seems appropriate, 
taking into account the time gap between the two datasets. All in all, a listed Japanese company of 
any size is a family business, if it meets the following criteria: 
1. At least 25% of ownership is held by a single family or families; 
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2. Family equity holders are the founder(s) or acquirer(s) of the firm, or his/her(their) family’s 
member(s), or descendant(s) or any combination of those mentioned earlier; 
3. Family members are related either by blood or marriage or adoption; 
4. There is a potential to sustain the business across generations through family succession. 
It is noted that family relationships are determined by the same last names of family members.  
Regarding family ownership, shares can be owned not only by individual(s) but also by 
corporation(s) under the family’s or families’ control. In addition, a business is considered 
sustainable across generations if at least 1 member (either individual or corporate) from the founding 
family, but not the founder, is its major shareholder, or if at least 2 members (either individual or 
corporate) from the acquiring family are its major shareholders. Therefore, a firm managed solely by 
its entrepreneurial founder is not considered a family business since it lacks the multi-generational 
facet that results in FBs’ distinctive behavior and performance such as the long-term vision and the 
willingness to secure the business as a heritage for later generations.  Last but not least, family 
control can be either active or passive. Active family control means that one or more family 
members play a managerial role which can be either the firm’s CEO or other top management 
positions. In the case of no family involvement in management but only in ownership, the family 
control is passive. 
Section 2. FAMILY INVOLVEMENT AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Previous literature focusing on family businesses has illustrated higher profitability and greater 
efficiency associated with the presence of founding families. Compared to nonfamily enterprises, 
there are a number of competitive advantages that family businesses may enjoy.  
Firstly, family firms seem to suffer less from agency problem as a consequence of separated 
ownership and management, which is normally observed in large public corporations. Agency 
problem arises as a result of interest divergence and information asymmetry between principal 
(shareholder), who usually prefers long-term interests and firm’s value maximization, and agent 
(manager), who usually prefers short-term profits to get the most out of the period of employment 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). However, in a family business, ownership and management, in many 
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cases, are in the same hands. Otherwise, family owner and manager’s incentives are very likely to 
align for both often maintain long-term relationships with the business, in contrast to nonfamily 
firms of which management changes much more frequently. Hence, Sharma (2004) states that 
stewardship theory should be a more appropriate framework than the agency theory to study family-
controlled businesses. Under the stewardship theory, owner and manager speak with one voice as 
executives’ lone objectives are to protect the interests of their shareholders and deeply commit to the 
prosperity of the firm. In such an organization, the impact of agency problem will be diminished, 
resulting in lower agency costs (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Secondly, family-owned businesses tend to invest more efficiently than their nonfamily 
counterparts (James, 1999). Due to their long-lasting adherence to a business, family members 
understand the business and its industry thoroughly, and thus, are more willing to accept good long-
term investment projects rather than sacrifice these opportunities for short-term gains. Furthermore, 
as noted by Anderson & Reeb (2003), the desire to preserve control and pass the business on to 
future generations encourages family enterprises to finance innovative investments to remain current 
and competitive in the long run. Therefore, under the influence of families, family companies appear 
to perform better at allocating their funds than nonfamily companies, thanks to their attitude towards 
long-term planning and wealth creation.  
Finally, Anderson & Reeb (2003) argue that “the family’s reputation is more likely to create 
longer-lasting economic consequences for the firm relative to nonfamily firms where managers and 
directors turn over on a relatively continuous basis”. By keeping involved in a business, a family can 
improve its trust and develop a broad social network in the firm’s industry that, in the long run, will 
provide potential benefits for the firm. These benefits can be a lower cost of debt as suggested by 
Anderson et al. (2003) or more favorable terms with suppliers. 
Otherwise, there are also some counter-arguments indicating that the influence of a family on 
firm performance can be negative. A case in point is when conflicts arise among family members 
(Lee, 2006). Family members are not homogeneous and may have different interests. For example, 
some prefer higher dividends, while others lay emphasis on reinvestment and growth. The potential 
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for conflict increases as the family grows bigger, leading to a larger pool of diverse preferences, 
especially if every member holds just about the same voting power (“To have and to hold”. The 
Economist, Special Report, Family Companies, 18 April, 2015). However, as most empirical studies 
so far have supported the superior economic performance of family businesses relative to nonfamily 
firms, the positive effects seem to outweigh the negative. Hence, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Family businesses outperform nonfamily businesses in terms of profitability. 
Subsection 1. Family Involvement in Ownership  
Family ownership is one of the unique elements that family firms possess but do not substantially 
affect nonfamily firms. Thus, such a factor is expected to somehow contribute to the possible 
difference in profitability between these two firm types. 
There has been a vast amount of literature theoretically and empirically investigating the impact 
of ownership structures on firms’ financial outcomes. For example, Shleifer & Vishny (1986) has 
detected that ownership concentration positively influences performance. Indeed, holding a larger 
equity stake of a firm makes changes in its performance more significantly affect a shareholder’s 
wealth. Therefore, the shareholder will have stronger incentives to monitor managers and reduce 
manager discretion. The same behavior is very true for family owners who usually assume 
concentrated ownership and regard their holdings as long-term investments. They will deeply engage 
in monitoring activity and very often occupy senior management positions because the family’s 
welfare is very closely linked to the firm performance. Thereby, ownership concentration enables 
families to impose control over their managers, and thus, deal with the agency problem and short-
term focus that widely held corporations still struggle to confront. 
Despite the positive effects it may bring, concentrated ownership also has its defects. Anderson & 
Reeb (2003) have discovered a nonlinear relationship between the level of family ownership and 
firm performance, though, on average, family enterprises outperform nonfamily enterprises with 
regards to profitability. In particular, family businesses demonstrate increasingly higher 
performance, until family ownership reaches about one-third of total outstanding shares. 
Performance keeps improving, but at decreasing rates, up to almost two-third of ownership. Thus, it 
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can be inferred that excessive ownership concentration may harm performance in some way. 
According to Andres (2008), the problem occurs when large stockholders use their control rights to 
act on their own behalf and maximize their benefits at the expense of minority stockholders. For 
instance, in a family-controlled firm, the family is likely to refrain from using risky sources of funds 
such as debts, and thus, give up the potential benefits of interest tax shields. This action pleases the 
family’s desire for continuity but inflicts extra costs on small well-diversified shareholders.   
In short, empirical evidence has implied different effects that family ownership may have on 
family firms’ accounting performance. However, compared to nonfamily companies, family 
ownership generally leads to better performance for family companies. Hence, my next hypothesis is 
set as follows:   
Hypothesis 2: Family ownership has a positive linear relationship with firm profitability. 
Subsection 2. Family Involvement in Management 
Disparities in existing literature make the effects of family involvement in management remain 
unclear. Research usually focuses on answering whether family CEOs can outperform nonfamily 
CEOs. 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2006) and Andres (2008) have indicated that founder-managed 
companies perform better than both nonfamily companies and descendant-managed companies. 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) have also confirmed that the strongest positive effects of family 
engagement on firm performance can be achieved with founder CEOs. There are many reasons for 
the superior performance of family firms under the supervision of their founders. Aside from 
exclusive knowledge about the company itself and its broader industry, family founders can easily 
build trust and loyalty with other directors and family members based on their reputation, position 
and concentrated voting control. Moreover, family founders with their entrepreneurial spirit tend to 
boost firm growth by investing in long-term and innovative projects.  
Apart from founders, it is generally believed that family CEOs are less competent than 
professional CEOs. In an attempt to appoint a member as CEO, a family firm has restricted 
executive talents to a much smaller labor pool, from labor market point of view. As a result, the heir 
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may not meet the founder’s brain and character, and usually spend a lot of time and energy to build 
trust and retain family control.  Even worse, it has been pointed out by Villalonga & Amit (2006) 
that “when descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed”. Succession is difficult in all 
organizations, especially in family businesses. Schulze et al. (2001) have noticed that a family firm 
may well be the victim of parental altruism as parents tend to show generosity to their children. 
Chrisman et al. (2004) have stated the same argument and added that even if the children lack 
competence and perform poorly, it is hard to impose punishments without eroding family 
relationships even outside the firm. On the other side, McConaughy & Phillips (1999) offer the 
opposite perspective by claiming that descendant-led enterprises operate more efficiently and 
profitably than founder-led enterprises in spite of the latter’s faster growth and capital-intensive 
investments in research and technological advance.  
Tackling the problem of disappointing successors, one of the most popular solutions applied by 
many family firms is to employ nonfamily professional CEOs and managers. A prominent stream of 
research has illustrated that outsider CEOs appear to have more experiences and better managerial 
skills than their family counterparts (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Sonfield & Lussier, 2009; Miller et al., 
2013). Accordingly, Miller et al. (2014) have observed that nonfamily CEOs can achieve superior 
performance if they are supervised by several family owners instead of a lone owner. Meanwhile, 
Villalonga & Amit (2006) have reported higher value creation in a family firm when the founder 
CEO or a hired CEO monitored by the founder chairman takes charge. 
Given the inconsistent results promoted by previous studies, my last pair of hypotheses is 
formulated as follows:   
Hypothesis 3: Family firms are more profitable when family founders as opposed to outsiders serve 
as CEOs.  
Hypothesis 4: Family firms are more profitable when outsiders as opposed to family successors 
serve as CEOs. 
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CHAPTER 3. DATA AND VARIABLES 
Section 1. DATA – SAMPLE COLLECTION 
To examine the possible gap in profitability of family and nonfamily firms, I start with a sample 
as large as possible for data restrictions on my other variables in subsequent tests may narrow its 
size. The time frame for my data is from 2011 to 2016, since the term “Industry 4.0” was first 
introduced in 2011, at the Hannover Fair in Germany, signaling the beginning of the fourth 
technological revolution. This time frame is chosen for the purpose of obtaining more accurately the 
effects of the digital era on Japanese companies’ profitability. Besides, the time is long enough to 
gather a relatively large sample size. 
My initial sample consists of Japanese publicly traded corporations in operation over the 2011-
2016 period from SPEEDA database as of 8 May, 2018. The search results in 3,717 firms with all 
REITs and ETFs kept out from the sample. For each company, I record its name, SPEEDA industry 
(specific and general), fiscal year-end, CEO, foundation date, 10 major shareholders’ names and 
ownership
(1)
, accounting standard, total sales, total assets, D/E ratio and R&D expenses. Further 
ownership and management information
(2)
 such as names and positions of executives are manually 
supplemented from www.4-traders.com/. Some financial figures and corporate histories are retrieved 
from https://www.morningstar.com/, individual family websites and other related sources. After 
excluding all of the companies with insufficient data or missing value for any variable in later 
analyses, the total of 1,492 firms are documented as the final sample over the period of 2011-2016, 
consisting of 1,277 nonfamily and 215 family companies classified by the definition in the previous 
chapter (List of the 215 family Japanese public firms in the sample can be found in Appendix 1). 
The 1,492 companies acquired operate in more than 200 specific industries which are grouped 
into 16 broader categories (or general industries), as defined by SPEEDA. Family businesses in the 
final sample appear to be more prevalent in several industries including consumer services (3) and 
retail (14), yet show little or no presence in industries such as commodity (1), materials/processed 
                                                        
(1)&(2) The ownership and management data are only available at the closest possible dates. Thus, I assume that the 
ownership and management structures remain stable during the investigated period. 
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materials (10), transportation equipment and services (15&16) and finance (6).   Further details are 
presented in Table 1. Since there are too many specific industries, I will employ the 16 general 
industries to control the possible industry effects on firm performance. Accordingly, dummy 
variables to denote 15 out of 16 general industries will be added in my later multivariate analyses. 
Table 1. Industry Presence of Japanese Family and Nonfamily Firms, 2011-2016 
(n = 1,492 firms) 
Ordinal General Industries NFBs FBs 
%FBs in 
Industry 
1 Commodity 12 1 7.69 
2 Construction/Real Estate 162 17 9.50 
3 Consumer Services 3 6 66.67 
4 Corporate Services 25 5 16.67 
5 Distribution 42 11 20.75 
6 Finance 3 0 0.00 
7 Food/Consumer Products 126 37 22.70 
8 Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals 51 14 21.54 
9 Machinery/Electrical Products 319 56 14.93 
10 Materials/Processed Materials 291 24 7.62 
11 Media/Info-Communications Services 81 25 23.58 
12 Public Services 18 2 10.00 
13 Restaurants/Prepared Food 6 1 14.29 
14 Retail 4 5 55.56 
15 Transportation Equipment 122 10 7.58 
16 Transportation Services 12 1 7.69 
Section 2. VARIABLES DESCRIPTION  
Subsection 1.  Dependent Variable 
Return on assets (ROA) will be chosen as the dependent variable for my later analyses, since it is 
a well-understood and common expression to represent profitability. To calculate ROA, both 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) and net income (NI) can 
deliver effective measurement of profits (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  In my approach, I use EBITDA 
divided by book value of total assets to compute ROA. 
Subsection 2. Control Variables 
In order to better assess relative relationships between dependent and independent variables, 
several control variables will be introduced to restrain the possible influences of company-specific 
and industry features on my empirical results. The control variables are listed as follows:  
14 
 
 Ln(Size): Natural logarithm of book value of total assets, 
 Ln(Age): Natural logarithm of number of complete years since a company’s foundation 
date, 
 Leverage: Debt-to-Equity (D/E) ratio, which is computed by sum of short- and long-
term debts divided by shareholders’ equity, 
Since Japanese firms do not apply a single accounting standard and the same performance may differ 
when expressed in different standards, I create 2 dummy variables to monitor possible effects of 
different bookkeeping principles. 
 IFRS: Dummy variable equals 1 if a company follows the International Financial 
Reporting Standards, 0 otherwise, 
 SEC: Dummy variable equals 1 if a company follows the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s accounting standards, 0 otherwise. 
In the case that both dummies (IFRS & SEC) equal 0, that company follows the 
Japanese accounting standards (Japanese GAAP), 
As the dataset is comprised of 1,492 Japanese listed firms repeatedly observed over the period from 
2011 to 2016, these firms may have some characteristics that remain unchanged over time. To avoid 
omitted variable bias caused by the cross-section and time-series nature of the data, I create the 
following dummy variables to capture the industry fixed effect and time fixed effect in later models.  
 Commodity, Construction/Real Estate, Consumer Services, Corporate Services, 
Distribution, Food/Consumer Products, Healthcare/Pharmaceuticals, 
Machinery/Electrical Products, Materials/Processed Materials, Media/Info-
Communications Services, Public Services, Restaurants/Prepared Food, Retail, 
Transportation Equipment and Transportation Services: 15 industry dummies imply 
16 general industries in the sample. An industry dummy equals 1 if a firm operates in 
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the particular industry that the dummy represents, 0 otherwise. In the case that all of 
the industry dummies equal 0, that company belongs to the “Finance” industry
(3)
.  
 FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, FY2015 and FY2016: 5 year dummies imply 6 years of 
the observation period (2011-2016). A year dummy equals 1 if an observation occurs 
in the year that the dummy presents, 0 otherwise. In the case that all of the year 
dummies equal 0, that observation occurs in 2011. 
Subsection 3.  Explanatory Variables 
 Variables of interest 
To investigate the possible difference in profitability between family and nonfamily enterprises as 
discussed in the literature review, a dummy variable, “Family Business”, will be tested in later 
models, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of this dummy will reflect the effect on firm profitability 
caused by the presence of a family or families. Intuitively, all of the nonfamily companies in the 
sample will be treated as the base group to study the nature of family companies.  
To explain the gap if it exists, factors that are usually present in family firms but not in nonfamily 
firms should be examined. In my research, family control is such a factor. Family control is imposed 
on a business through ownership and management. The family ownership effect will be explored 
through an explanatory variable, “Family Ownership”. The family management effect will also be 
studied by comparing the profitability of family businesses led by family founder, descendant and 
professional (nonfamily) CEOs, using 2 dummy variables, “Founder” and “Descendant”. Further 
descriptions of the variables of interest are as follows: 
 Family Business: Dummy variable equals 1 if a company is a family business as 
defined earlier in this study, 0 otherwise,   
 Family Ownership: Total percentage of ownership held by a family or families in a 
company, 
                                                        
(3) When conducting regression analysis on family firms only, the “Finance” industry will be absent in this sample. 
Therefore, there should be only 14 industry dummies instead of 15. In such a case, firm(s) in the “Commodity” 
industry will be selected as the base group. 
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 Founder CEO: Dummy variable equals 1 if a family company’s CEO is its founder or 
acquirer, 0 otherwise,  
 Descendant CEO: Dummy variable equals 1 if a family company’s CEO is its founder 
or acquirer’s descendant, 0 otherwise. 
In the case that both dummies (Founder CEO & Descendant CEO) equal 0, that 
family company’s CEO is a hired (professional) CEO from outside the family. 
 Other explanatory variable  
 Innovation: The ratio of a firm’s research and development (R&D) expenses to its total 
sales. 
A lot of research has highlighted the link between R&D, innovation and growth. Specifically, 
innovation driven by R&D has been considered by Solow (1957) as a key driver of productivity and 
economic growth. As proposed by Baumann & Kritikos (2016), predicted R&D intensity and the 
probability of reporting innovation are positively correlated. Meanwhile, He & Wintoki (2016) has 
regarded R&D as the cost of innovation. In this paper, the performance of family and nonfamily 
firms is assessed under the disruptive effects of the fourth industrial revolution. Thus, another 
element conveying the nature of the digital era, which potentially influences the profitability of both 
types of firms, should be taken into account. This element can be expressed by another variable 
named “Innovation”. Similar to any other technological transformations and even more than ever, 
the start of the fourth wave is the critical time for every business to change to survive or to lag 
behind to wither. To change, a business needs to develop new products or experiment new 
procedures or even apply new business models. All of these growth opportunities require 
investments in innovations and technological developments. Given the connection between R&D 
and innovation stated earlier, the new variable should be determined by a R&D-based measure like 
above.  
Section 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND OTHER UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
Subsection 1.  Summary Statistics 
Table 2, 3 and 4 below provide summary statistics for the final sample of 1,492 Japanese publicly 
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traded companies from 2011 to 2016. Means, medians, standard deviations and extreme values of 
several firm-specific variables are presented in Table 2. The average firm in the sample has a return 
on assets of 8.33%. The maximum ROA is as high as 88.18%, while the minimum is as low as -
46.52%. However, a negative ROA does not necessarily mean that a company is losing money. It can 
be the case that the company is acquiring assets or new technologies to generate future profits, 
resulting in a negative net income. Correspondingly, a high positive ROA does not always suggest 
remarkable performance but perhaps a lack of investments. Indeed, quite a few enterprises do not 
invest at all in R&D, whereas others seem to take these growth opportunities seriously. On average, 
roughly 2.53% of total sales are spent on R&D by the firms in the dataset. Some firms in the sample 
have zero leverage while others are facing insolvency problem with the debt-to-equity ratio of 
274.65. Firm size measured by value of total assets also varies considerably, from 192 JPY million to 
48,800,000 JPY million. The average age of the sample companies is around 62 years, though some 
of them have just been incorporated right before the beginning of the examination period.   
Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Return on Assets (ROA) (%) 8.33 7.99 5.22 -46.52 88.18 
R&D Expenses/Total Sales (%) 2.53 1.35 4.68 0 232.07 
D/E Ratio 0.63 0.29 3.22 0 274.65 
Total Assets (JPY Million) 383,185.2 55,575.5 1,706,054.6 192 4.88e+07 
Firm Age (years) 62.11 64 24.32 1 135 
 
Table 3 reports difference of means tests when comparing the key variables between two groups 
of firms: family and nonfamily. Family companies account for nearly 14.41% of the sample. From 
the table, family firms, in general, appear to significantly differ from nonfamily firms in terms of 
profitability, investment behavior, level of leverage, size and age (all at 1% significance level). On 
average, family companies are younger in age and smaller in size. They have higher ROA yet tend to 
spend less on R&D. With a mean D/E ratio of 0.50, they seem to less rely on debts than nonfamily 
counterparts with a mean D/E ratio of 0.66.  Among family-owned enterprises, only 30.70% hire 
outsider CEOs, while the rest are managed by family founders (14.88%) and descendants (54.42%). 
In contrast, a majority of widely owned enterprises are led by hired hands.    
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 Table 3. Difference of Means Tests 
Family and nonfamily groups of firms are separated using “Family Business” dummy variable. 
*** indicates statistical significance at 1% level. 
 NFBs FBs t-statistic 
Return on Assets (ROA) (%) 8.24 8.85 -3.55*** 
R&D Expenses/Total Sales (%) 2.59 2.20 3.97*** 
D/E Ratio 0.66 0.50 3.50*** 
Total Assets (JPY Million) 435,337 73,428 16.26*** 
Firm Age (years) 64.41 48.42 27.54*** 
    
Family Ownership (%) 2.97 40.05 -1.2e+02*** 
Founder CEOs (%) 2.51 14.88 -12.29*** 
Descendant CEOs (%) 14.17 54.42 -27.88*** 
Outsider CEOs (%) 83.32 30.70 38.88*** 
    
No. of Firms 1,277 215  
No. of Observations 7,662 1,290  
 
A correlation matrix for selected variable is exhibited in Table 4. The presence of families and 
family ownership appear to be positively correlated with ROA yet negative with investments in 
R&D, level of leverage, firm size and age. These relations will be investigated more deeply using 
multivariate regression analyses in later part of this paper. 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix  
 
Family 
Business 
ROA 
Family 
Ownership 
R&D/ Total 
Sales 
D/E 
ratio 
Ln(Total 
assets) 
Ln(Firm 
Age) 
Family 
Business 
1.0000       
ROA 0.0407 1.0000      
Family 
Ownership 
0.8809 0.0417 1.0000     
R&D Exp./ 
Total Sales 
-0.0293 -0.1058 -0.0314 1.0000    
D/E Ratio -0.0173 -0.0628 -0.0182 -0.0217 1.0000   
Ln(Total 
assets) 
-0.2465 0.1598 -0.2937 0.0152 0.0062 1.0000  
Ln(Firm 
Age) 
-0.1518 -0.0684 -0.1555 -0.0855 -0.0277 0.1878 1.0000 
Subsection 2. Other Univariate Results 
In the digital era, companies must keep innovating, and thus, R&D investments will be the key to 
help them obtain technological developments and stay competitive in the marketplace. In this part, 
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some figures reflecting the digital era effect on firm investment behavior are shown. The first graph 
demonstrates the yearly average R&D expenditure of Japanese listed family and nonfamily firms 
from 2011 to 2016. It can be seen from the graph that the R&D expenditure grows across the years 
for both company types, though the nonfamily group displays far higher levels of investment, nearly 
10 times higher in value.  
     Figure 1. Yearly Average R&D Expenditure, 2011-2016 
(in JPY million) 
 
The second chart reveals the yearly average R&D intensity (R&D expenses as a portion of total 
sales) of the same dataset during the same examination period. Again, the numbers for both groups 
follow upward trends and nonfamily enterprises, on average, tend to spend a larger part of sales on 
R&D, although the differences between groups are no longer as significant as in the above case. 
Besides, it is worth noting that the level of R&D intensity may vary across different industries, and 
that greater investments in R&D or higher levels of R&D intensity do not necessarily mean better at 
innovating. It is advantageous if companies can have more capacity for investments. However, rather 
than how huge the investments are, how effectively they can be utilized matters more.          
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
729 765 996 1035 1070 1049 
9212 9354 
9933 10186 
10523 10467 
FBs NFBs
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Figure 2. Yearly Average R&D Intensity Level, 2011-2016 
(in %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2.09 2.16 2.17 
2.23 2.26 2.28 
2.65 2.61 2.66 2.53 2.50 2.58 
FBs NFBs
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
My research focuses on examining the relationship between profitability and family involvement 
in both ownership and management. A Likelihood Ratio test was used to justify whether pooled OLS 
regression model or least squares dummy variables model should be chosen for my multivariate 
analyses. The null hypothesis states that the simpler model (the pooled OLS regression in this case) 
provides as good a fit for the data as the more complex model (the least squares dummy variables). 
Given the p-value of the test was very close to zero, the null hypothesis was strongly rejected. As 
extra variables added substantially improve its goodness-of-fit, the latter model appears to be more 
appropriate, and thus, is selected to conduct further regression analyses. In this paper, the least 
squares dummy variables model resembles a two-way fixed effects model, which was once 
employed by Anderson & Reeb in their 2003 article. As previously mentioned, the industry and time 
fixed effects are controlled by including dummy variables for general industries and years of 
observation into multivariate OLS regressions.  
In order to test my hypotheses, I perform a series of multivariate regressions using OLS estimator 
constructed as follows: 
ROA = α1 + D1(Family Business) + βX + ε1                                  (1) 
ROA = α2 + D2(Family Business) + β1(Family Ownership) + β2(Innovation) + βX + ε2           (2) 
ROA = α3 + β3(Family Ownership) + β4(Innovation) + D3(Founder CEO)  
+ D4(Descendant CEO) + βX + ε3                       (3) 
where ROA denotes returns on assets, Family Business is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm is 
family-owned and equal to 0 if it is widely held, X represents a set of control variables stated earlier 
in the paper consisting of Ln(Size), Ln(Age), Leverage, IFRS, SEC, industry dummies and year 
dummies (More detailed variable descriptions can be found in Chapter 3). Family Ownership and 
Innovation are explanatory variables: the former measures total percentage of ownership held by a 
family or families in a company and the latter measures the ratio of a firm’s research and 
development (R&D) expenses to its total sales. Founder CEO and Descendant CEO are binary 
variables equal to 0 if an outsider serves as CEO. The Founder CEO dummy is 1 if a family firm has 
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a founder or acquirer CEO, the Descendant CEO dummy is 1 if a family firm has a family successor 
CEO. D1, β1, D3 and D4 are the coefficients of interest in equation (1), (2) and (3). Respectively, α1, 
α2, α3 and ε1, ε2, ε3 indicate each model’s constant and error term. 
Generally, the first two specifications above consider nonfamily companies as a benchmark for 
comprehending the impact of family presence on profitability through ownership. In the first 
regression, the coefficient D1 will reveal the difference in profitability, if exists, between two groups: 
family and nonfamily firms. In an attempt to clarify the driving forces behind such a disparity, other 
than the variables in previous regressions, two new independent variables (Family Ownership and 
Innovation) have been added into specification (2). If statistically significant, β1 will illustrate the 
relation between family ownership and firm financial performance. The third equation also seeks to 
realize the impact of family presence on profitability yet through management, by evaluating 
performance among family-run firms with different types of leaders. D3 and D4 will signify whether 
family firms managed by family members or by outsiders are likely to be more profitable. 
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CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Section 1. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
The empirical results of the three multivariate OLS regressions are summarized in Table 5. In all 
output columns, return on assets (ROA) is the dependent variable, measuring firm financial 
performance, in particular, profitability. The first two specifications employ all 1,492 family and 
nonfamily firms in the sample for comparison between the two groups, while the third only concerns 
about evidence for differentiation among family businesses.  
Table 5. Profitability and Family Involvement in Businesses  
(Estimated by Least Squares Dummy Variables Model) 
The table reports the results of the three multivariate OLS regressions mentioned in Chapter 4. The sample includes 
1,492 listed Japanese firms over the 2011-2016 period (8,952 company-year observations). Of these 1,492 
companies, 215 are family and 1,277 are nonfamily businesses. The dependent variable for all three columns is ROA. 
Independent variables are Family Ownership and Innovation. Control variables consist of Ln(Size), Ln(Age), 
Leverage, IFRS, SEC, industry dummies and year dummies. Please refer to Chapter 3 for more detailed variable 
descriptions. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All specifications 
include intercepts. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using 
the Huber-White sandwich estimator for variance.  
Least Squares 
Dummy Variables Model 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
-0.025** 
(-2.42) 
-0.023** 
(-2.23) 
-0.012 
(-0.35) 
Family Business 
0.010*** 
(5.33) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
 
Family Ownership  
0.023*** 
(3.06) 
0.010 
(0.78) 
Innovation  
-0.203*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.338*** 
(-6.59) 
Founder CEO   
0.028*** 
(5.60) 
Descendant CEO   
0.018*** 
(5.55) 
Ln(Size) 
0.007*** 
(14.46) 
0.007*** 
(15.24) 
0.009*** 
(4.64) 
Ln(Age) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.007*** 
(-6.00) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.62) 
Leverage 
-0.001 
(-1.65) 
-0.001 
(-1.62) 
-0.013*** 
(-6.72) 
IFRS 
-0.006 
(-1.57) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
-0.063* 
(-1.76) 
SEC 
-0.006 
(-1.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.48) 
-0.022 
(-1.51) 
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Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
No. of Observations 
R2 
8,952 
0.1104 
8,952 
0.1373 
1,290 
0.2069 
 
In the first column, Family Business is the only explanatory variable. Its estimated parameter will 
determine the magnitude and significance of the return gap between the two company types. As 
anticipated, the coefficient of the dummy is positive and statistically different from zero at 1% level, 
suggesting that family companies, on average, are 1% more profitable than their nonfamily 
counterparts, after controlling for company-specific features, industry affiliation and time-series 
noise. This finding shows strong support for the first hypothesis that, overall, family businesses 
outperform nonfamily businesses in terms of profitability. It also corroborates the conclusion of a 
prominent stream of research such as Anderson & Reeb (2003), Lee (2006), Allouche et al. (2008) 
and Andres (2008). 
The effect of family involvement on firm performance in the digital era are reexamined in 
column (2) by adding into the picture two components: Family Ownership – one form of family 
control suspected to attribute to the return differences between the two groups, and Innovation – an 
expression of the impact caused by the fourth technological revolution on the performance of both 
groups. After this action, the difference between FBs and NFBs’ yields decreases and becomes 
insignificant, suggesting that the extra variables do offer some explanation power.  
The parameter estimate of Family Ownership in equation (2) is 0.023 and significant at 1% level. 
Thus, family equity stake has a positive linear relationship with firm profitability, as proposed by 
Hypothesis 2. Holding other things equal, 1% increase in family shareholding improves firm 
profitability by 0.023%, on average. This result reinforces Andres’s position in his 2008 research. 
Nonetheless, it is rather overstating to interpret family possession as a superior organizational 
structure from these outputs. According to Andres (2008), family holding is only one form of 
concentrated ownership. If an investor or a group of investors can retain a sizable equity stake with 
similar incentives to reduce agency costs and boost value creation, the comparable positive effect 
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may be observed. Andres (2008) also comments that family ownership can be harmful. The desire 
for control preservation of family owners may hinder access to external sources of financing, 
explaining for less family presence “in capital-intensive and heavily regulated industries”, for 
instance, finance (6), public and transportation services (12&16) in my sample (Please refer to 
Chapter 3 for more information on industry distribution). 
Regarding the other determinant – Innovation, its coefficient in the second specification is also 
significant at 1% level but with a negative sign. In this case, the variable Innovation represents R&D 
intensity, which is usually used to measure a firm’s commitment to its innovative efforts. Ultimately, 
investments in R&D are expected to enhance the profitability of a firm. They creates value for the 
firm by offering competitive advantages through differentiation of products and services (Ike & 
Kingsley, 2010). Therefore, normally, a positive association between R&D intensity and profitability 
should be anticipated. However, research has found that R&D investments and operating 
performance are negatively correlated in short run (Chaiporn & Olimpia, 2016) and positively 
correlated in long run (Eberhart et al., 2004).  Ike & Kingsley (2010) also agree that R&D projects 
are treated by firms as long term investments with high risks and no instant payoff. In this paper, as 
the short-term relation between R&D and profitability is under investigation, their negative 
relationship is comprehensible. Despite improving the operating performance of subsequent years 
while taking lags, R&D investments cut into short-term profits, and thus, profitability in short run, 
whether they are recognized as expenses or intangible assets amortized periodically 
(Anagnostopoulou, 2008). Innovation also enters the third equation significantly, once again 
highlighting the disruptive effect of current emerging technology breakthroughs. Meanwhile, Family 
Ownership has quickly lost its explanatory value when incorporated with other variables indicative 
of divergence in profitability among family enterprises characterized by different categories of 
CEOs: family founder, family descendant and professional outsider. 
Further investigation of family involvement in management in column (3) yields positive and 
significant estimated parameters (at 1% level) for Founder CEO and Descendant CEO, indicating 
that active family control is associated with improved profitability. As expected, the strongest 
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accounting performance of FBs can be achieved when their founders serve as CEOs. The values of 
the coefficients are 0.028 for Founder CEO and 0.018 for Descendant CEO. These figures imply 
that, on average, compared to in professionally managed family firms, ROA is 2.8% higher than in 
founder-controlled and 1.8% higher in descendant-controlled family firms. The findings are close to 
those shown by Anderson & Reeb (2003) but partially contradictory to those realized by Andres 
(2008) that descendants and hired managers have equal chance of success as CEOs in FBs. While 
the regression output on Founder CEO is strongly in favor of Hypothesis 3, the negative sign of the 
coefficient on Descendant CEO is against my prediction in the last Hypothesis 4 that family firms 
are more profitable with outsider CEOs than with family successor CEOs. There are possible reasons 
behind the discrepancy between the actual findings and the hypothesized positions. One typical 
reason is that Japanese families have addressed potential solutions to the notorious succession 
dilemma. For example, instead of incompetent heirs, better ones are found or even “created” for 
takeover. According to The Economist’s special report on family companies
(4)
, to address a family 
firm’s vulnerability to the lack of expertise, a talented man or star employee can be either adopted or 
married into a family as a son or a son-in-law. Through adoption and marriage, a family can not only 
draw talents from outside into itself but also put biological inheritors under competitive pressure, 
forcing them to make serious efforts if they wish to gain control of the family business. 
In all of the regressions, some of the controls show significant impacts on firm profitability. 
Generally, they are consistent with evidence in prior literature. Significant at 1% level, Ln(Size) 
(indicator of firm size) has a positive association with ROA, whereas the inverse relationship holds 
between Ln(Age) (indicator of firm age) and ROA. In other words, a firm’s profitability relative to 
its total assets is higher the larger its total assets and lower the longer a firm operates. Indeed, larger 
corporations usually engage in different activities which help diversify their risks and at the same 
time capture various income streams. These diversified sources lead to more stable earnings, and 
thus, better financial performance along with more favorable financing conditions. Small companies, 
on the other hand, have limited access to capital and find it harder to attract and retain good staff 
                                                        
(4) “To have and to hold”. The Economist, Special Report, Family Companies, 18 April, 2015. 
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(Aldrich & Auster, 1986). Thanks to their sizes, larger firms can also benefit from economies of 
scale associated with lower costs and higher bargaining power over their suppliers. Meanwhile, 
firms’ profitability seems to decline with age. One reason for the negative relation between firm age 
and performance is suggested by Hannan & Freeman (1989) and Leonard-Barton (1992) that inertia 
compounded as firms grow older. According to these authors, older firms attempt to achieve 
efficiency by focusing more on core capabilities, and thus, are characterized by highly routinized and 
structured operating processes. Such rigidities hinder companies from rapidly and appropriately 
reacting to innovation signals sent by the market (Leonard-Barton, 1992), making their knowledge 
and skills become obsolete and incompatible with the business environment and consequently 
leading to acceleration in organizational decay (Agarwal & Gort, 1996 & 2002). Lastly, neither of 
the coefficients on leverage is significant when the sample comprises both FBs and NFBs. 
Nevertheless, leverage level appears to be significantly negatively related to firm performance at 1% 
level when only family businesses are under examination. Keeping other variables equal, 1% 
increase in D/E ratio, on average, drives family firm profitability down by 0.013%. 
In summary, the outcomes of regression analysis verify the hypothesis that family involvement in 
ownership and management are positively associated with firm profitability. 
Section 2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation 
To evaluate the robustness of the results, I first perform the White’s test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the error distribution and another test for autocorrelation of residuals from 
every regression. The test statistics reject the null hypotheses of homoskedasticity and no serial 
correlation at 1% level for all of the specifications. Hence, the Huber-White sandwich estimator for 
variance is employed to obtain unbiased standard errors of OLS coefficients under heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation.  
 Pool OLS regression model – An alternative approach 
As another robustness check, I test the sensitivity of my findings by using an alternative 
specification, the pool OLS regression model, for another regression analysis. The new regression 
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outputs support the previous results, though most parameter estimates have slightly lower values and 
become a bit less significant. The outcomes of the test are available in Appendix 2. 
 Nonlinearity 
Anderson & Reeb in their 2003 research has argued that the relation between family ownership 
and performance is nonlinear. They further states that the positive influence of family holding starts 
to become weaker when family ownership surpasses 31% of total outstanding shares. Therefore, to 
detect possible nonlinearities in the relationship between family equity stake and profitability in this 
paper, I graph two augmented component-plus-residual plots (also known as augmented partial 
residual plots) in Stata for both the least squares dummy variables model (using equation (2)) and the 
pool OLS regression model (using equation (2) after excluding industry dummies and year 
dummies). These graphs are presented in Appendix 3. Overall, the entire pattern in each plot looks 
fairly uniform. Thus, there should not be any concern about nonlinearities in the family ownership 
and performance relation.   
 Endogeneity 
Empirical studies investigating the relation between ownership and performance are potentially 
subjected to endogeneity problem. In the case of family businesses, despite the positive significant 
correlation between the family ownership and profitability, it is still questionable whether family 
control under the form of ownership results in the improvement in profit creation or strong 
performance encourages family owners to retain their shares.  In this paper, I will not conduct any 
IV-2SLS regressions to assess my findings’ robustness to endogeneity due to the lack of data for 
both possible instrument and exogenous variables.  
However, it can be argued that the reversed causality that good performance leads to long-lasting 
family equity stake appears to be unlikely. In their 2003 paper, Anderson & Reeb suggest that 
information asymmetry very often exists between family members and other shareholders due to 
families’ large shareholding and frequent supervision of the business activities as senior 
management. As a result, families are more certain about the future prospects of their firms. Both 
Anderson & Reed (2003) and Andres (2008) agree that it seems unreasonable, if not impossible, for 
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families to predict performance over several decades since they appear to keep rather steady 
ownership stakes over generations. In my sample, families, on average, also maintain their holding 
for nearly 49 years. Additionally, in spite of the advantageous insights into their firms’ future 
outlook, families did not give up family control even in periods of bad performance, recessions and 
other tough economic times (Andres, 2008). All of the aforementioned evidence confirms that family 
ownership is the cause of superior profitability.     
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the oldest form of business organization, family business has remained a distinct and 
important feature of the Japanese corporate landscape for centuries. Many have been predicting the 
downfall of family dynasties yet observing growing evidence that these firms can manage to survive 
and even flourish in the most sophisticated forms of modern societies. As a result, many assumptions 
about the sustainability, durability and longevity of family businesses will have to be rethought.  
Given the increasing integration of global economies and the arrival of the digital era, every business 
must change to survive, to compete and to thrive. Technological disruptions again raise the question 
whether or not the unique way of running the business and the distinctive ownership structure can 
make family firms better performers relative to their nonfamily counterparts, in the current economic 
environment? With a sample of 1,492 companies in Japan over the 2011-2016 period, this study 
examines the possible difference in financial performance between family and nonfamily business, 
using return on assets as the profitability-based measure. The paper also addresses the potential 
impacts of two main forms of family control, ownership and management, on firm profitability. 
My results reveal that on average, the presence of a family or families associates with superior 
performance on profitability of family enterprises, as compared to nonfamily enterprises. I also 
notice that the higher the family ownership stakes, the better improved the performance of the firms 
and vice versa. Among family businesses, the ones under family supervision (regardless of being run 
by founder or descendant CEOs) perform better than those managed by hired professionals from 
outside. The strongest positive effects of family engagement on performance can be achieved when 
founder CEOs take charge. A possible reasoning behind these findings is the extraordinary insights 
of family owners into their business and its surrounding industry which hired CEOs may lack. Other 
outcomes of the deep involvement in all decisions of family executives are consistent long-term 
strategies and effective allocation of scarce resources for investments. Last but not least, Japanese 
families have somehow come up with logical solutions to the succession problem of lacking 
competent heirs, for example, adoption and marriage. 
Despite its empirical contributions, my paper is still exposed to some limitations. First of all, my 
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study is limited to Japanese publicly traded companies during 2011-2016. Therefore, a vast number 
of family businesses in Japan which are privately held were not taken into account due to the 
unavailability of related data, although these firms may bring another picture to the conclusion of 
this paper. Another limitation of my study is that only return on assets was employed as the measure 
for performance in my document. Thus, the results are restricted to profitability rather than other 
performance criteria such as market value and growth. This fact gives room to future research to 
further verify the empirical findings of my paper by using alternative performance measures, for 
example, return on equity or Tobin’s Q ratio. Finally, it should be remarked that aside from the 
univariate results from Chapter 3, I did not conduct any further analysis on how the effect of the 
fourth industrial revolution or innovation behavior or innovation effectiveness differs for family and 
nonfamily businesses. For instance, are family firms better at innovating than their nonfamily 
counterparts during the fourth wave? Or the effectiveness of family and nonfamily firms’ innovative 
investments – does huge R&D expenditure mean truly innovative? These are all undeniably 
interesting topics that can be addressed in future research. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of Family Firms in the Sample and Shareholding  
(n = 215 firms) 
1. Showa Shell Sekiyu, KK – IDEMITSU family (31.25%) 
2. Suntory Beverage & Food, Ltd. – TORII family (59.48%) 
3. Rakuten, Inc. – MIKITANI family (37.3%) 
4. Otsuka Corporation – OTSUKA family (41.59%) 
5. Unicharm Corporation – TAKAHARA family (29.48%) 
6. Kose Corporation – KOBAYASHI family (45.61%) 
7. Transcosmos, Inc. – OKUDA family (31.07%) 
8. Pola Orbis Holdings, Inc. – SUZUKI family (57.79%) 
9. Nihon Chouzai Co., Ltd. – MITSUHARA family (54.89%) 
10. FP Corporation – KOMATSU family (32.38%) 
11. Dydo Group Holdings, Inc. – TAKAMATSU family (43.34%) 
12. Fukuda Corporation – FUKUDA family (27.24%) 
13. Hakuto Co., Ltd. – TAKAYAMA family (30.68%) 
14. Bourbon Corporation – YOSHIDA family (37.11%) 
15. Fancl Corporation – IKEMORI and MIYAJIMA families (36.19%) 
16. Keiyo Gas Co., Ltd. – KIKUCHI family (49.78%) 
17. Mitani Sangyo Co., Ltd. – MITANI family (49.56%) 
18. Mitsui High-tec, Inc. – MITSUI family (42.62%) 
19. Harima Chemicals Group, Inc. – HASEGAWA family (26.68%) 
20. Melco Holdings, Inc. – MAKI family (45.93%) 
21. Universal Entertainment Corporation – OKADA family (76.39%) 
22. Taiyo Holdings Co., Ltd. – KAWAHARA family (35.97%) 
23. Dai-ichi Seiko Co., Ltd. – KONISHI family (47.45%) 
24. Maruzen Co., Ltd. – WATANABE family (40.8%) 
25. Kimura Unity Co., Ltd. – KIMURA family (30.87%) 
26. Endo Lighting Corporation – ENDO family (34.66%) 
27. Tachikawa Corporation – TACHIKAWA family (31.58%) 
28. Koei Tecmo Holdings Co., Ltd. – ERIKAWA and KAKIHARA families (55.34%) 
29. Toyo Tanso Co., Ltd. – KONDO family (41.84%) 
30. Mirai Industry Co., Ltd. – YAMADA and SHIMIZU (26.2%) 
31. Nakanishi, Inc. – NAKANISHI family (31.26%) 
32. Daiki Axis Co., Ltd. – OGAME family (33.4%) 
33. Paltek Corporation – TAKAHASHI family (37.74%) 
34. Allied Telesis Holdings, KK – OSHIMA family (43.69%) 
35. Nakano Refrigerators Co., Ltd. – NAKANO family (29.03%) 
36. Zuken, Inc. – KANEKO family (35.75%) 
37. Yoshicon Co., Ltd. – YOSHIDA family (27.89%) 
38. Kyosha Co., Ltd. – KOJIMA family (31%) 
39. Tazmo Co., Ltd. – TORIGOE family (43.2%) 
40. Tabio Corporation – OCHI and KANEKO families (62.54%) 
41. Toyo Asano Foundation Co., Ltd. – UEMATSU family (28.69%) 
42. Ifuji Sangyo Co., Ltd. – FUJII and UDAKA families (51.76%) 
43. Odawara Engineering Co., Ltd. –TSUGAWA family (40.86%) 
44. Something Holdings Co., Ltd. – MAE and YAMAKAZA families (30.13%) 
45. Nippon Shikizai, Inc. – OKUMURA family (40.5%) 
46. Create Medic Co., Ltd. – NISHIMURA and NAKAO families (27.43%) 
47. Endo Manufacturing Co., Ltd. – ENDO family (31%) 
48. Daytona Corporation – ABE family (47.01%) 
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49. OSG Corporation Co., Ltd. – YUKAWA family (50.19%) 
50. Nihon ISK Co., Ltd. – HIROSAWA family (52.49%) 
51. Adjuvant Cosme Japan Co., Ltd. – NAKAMURA and TANAKA families (49.08%) 
52. Pro-Ship, Inc. – SUZUKI family (37.12%) 
53. Taiyo Industrial Co., Ltd. – HOSOE family (45.83%) 
54. AFC-HD Ams Life Science Co., Ltd. – ASAYAMA family (32.17%) 
55. Ahjikan Co., Ltd. – ASHIKAGA family (33.74%) 
56. Aisan Technology Co., Ltd. – KATO family (30.24%) 
57. Akikawa Foods & Farms Co., Ltd. – AKIKAWA family (46%) 
58. Aohata Corporation – NAKASHIMA and HATSUKADE families (57.16%) 
59. Aoi Electronics Co., Ltd. – OHNISHI family (59.9%) 
60. Ariake Japan Co., Ltd. – OKADA family (39.02%) 
61. Artnature, Inc. – IGARASHI family (30.64%) 
62. As One Corporation – IUCHI family (27.46%) 
63. Atomix, Inc. – NISHIKAWA family (30.19%) 
64. AXYZ Co., Ltd. – IJICHI family (50.62%) 
65. Being Co., Ltd. – TSUDA family (57.37%) 
66. BML, Inc. – KONDO family (39.39%) 
67. Bunkeido Co., Ltd. – MIZUTANI family (26.13%) 
68. C.Uyemura & Co., Ltd. – UEMURA family (25.68%) 
69. Car Mate MFG.Co., Ltd. – MURATA family (51.77%) 
70. Central Sports Co., Ltd. – GOTO family (40.22%) 
71. Chiyoda Ute Co., Ltd. – HIRATA family (29.62%) 
72. CMIC Holdings Co., Ltd. – NAKAMURA family (42.71%) 
73. Corona Corporation – UCHIDA family (47.39%) 
74. Cresco, Ltd. – IWASAKI family (31.19%) 
75. Daikoku Denki Co., Ltd. – KAYAMORI family (50.98%) 
76. Delica Foods Holdings Co., Ltd. – TACHIMOTO family (29.73%) 
77. Diamond Electric MFG.Co., Ltd. – IKENAGA family (40.12%) 
78. E.J Holdings, Inc. – KOTANI family (34.12%) 
79. Ebara Foods Industry, Inc. – MORIMURA family (30.33%) 
80. eBASE Co., Ltd. – TSUNEKANE family (41.27%) 
81. Elecom Co., Ltd. – HADA family (53.71%) 
82. EM Systems Co., Ltd. – KUNIMITSU family (38.48%) 
83. Enomoto Co., Ltd. – ENOMOTO family (25.53%) 
84. Fuji Latex Co., Ltd. – OKAMOTO family (51.73%) 
85. Fujikura Rubber, Ltd. – FUJIKURA family (25%) 
86. Fujipream Corporation – MATSUMOTO family (58.96%) 
87. Fukoku Co., Ltd. – KAWAMOTO family ( 32.52%) 
88. Fukutome Meat Packers, Ltd. – FUKUHARA family (45.56%) 
89. Funai Electric Co., Ltd. – FUNAI family (47.59%) 
90. Giken, Ltd. – KITAMURA family (32.15%) 
91. GMB Corporation – MATSUOKA family (41.59%) 
92. HABA Laboratories, Inc. – KOYANAGI family (39.85%) 
93. Harada Industry Co., Ltd. – HARADA family (59.81%) 
94. Heiwa Corporation – ISHIHARA family (45.32%) 
95. Hibino Corporation – HIBINO family (44.01%) 
96. Higashimaru Co., Ltd. – HIGASHI family (62.94%) 
97. HKS Co., Ltd. – HASEGAWA family (39.7%) 
98. Hob Co., Ltd. – TAKAHASHI family (42.9%) 
99. Hokuriku Gas Co., Ltd. – TSURUI family (25.92%) 
100. I-O Data Device, Inc. – HOSONO family (37.36%) 
101. Ichimasa Kamaboko Co., Ltd. – NOZAKI family (33.86%) 
102. Imagica Robot Holdings, Inc. – NAGASE family (61.49%) 
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103. IMV Corporation – KOJIMA family (36.19%) 
104. Ina Research, Inc. – NAKAGAWA family (34%) 
105. Inaba Seisakusho Co., Ltd. – INABA family (41.2%) 
106. Isamu Paint Co., Ltd. – KITAMURA family (46.87%) 
107. Ishigaki Foods Co., Ltd. – ISHIGAKI family (36.7%) 
108. ITO EN-U – HONJO family (26.98%) 
109. Ivy Cosmetics Corporation – SHIROGANE and ANDO families (41.07%) 
110. Japan Cash Machine Co., Ltd. – KAMIHIGASHI family (31.92%) 
111. Japan System Techniques Co., Ltd. – HIRABAYASHI family (29.95%) 
112. Jorudan Co., Ltd. – SATO family (51.67%) 
113. Kanefusa Corporation – WATANABE and OHTA family (48.94%) 
114. Kawaguchi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. – YAMADA family (34.5%) 
115. Kikuchi Seisakusho Co., Ltd. – KIKUCHI family (46.1%) 
116. Koike-Ya, Inc. – KOIKE and KISHIDA families (40.65%) 
117. Kokusai Co., Ltd. – MATSUMOTO family (39.67%) 
118. Konami Holdings Corporation – KOZUKI family (27.52%) 
119. Koshidaka Holdings Co., Ltd – KOSHIDAKA family (39.83%) 
120. Kotobuki Spirits Co., Ltd – KAWAGOE family (29.88%) 
121. Kubotex Corporation – KUBO family (59.48%) 
122. Kyoritsu Electric Corporation – NISHI family (42.54%) 
123. Maeda Kosen Co., Ltd – MAEDA family (36.43%) 
124. Marusan-Ai Co., Ltd – SATO and ISHIDA families (28.62%) 
125. Marvelous, Inc. – NAKAYAMA family (28.56%) 
126. Masaru Corporation – KURIGAMI and KARIYA families (36.44%) 
127. Matsuda Sangyo Co., Ltd – MATSUDA family (37.8%) 
128. Matsuya Foods Co., Ltd – KAWARABUKI family (38.59%) 
129. Medikit Co., Ltd – NAKAJIMA family (52.75%) 
130. Meiko Electronics Co., Ltd – NAYA family (25.86%) 
131. Mimaki Engineering Co., Ltd – IKEDA and TAKANA families (30.23%) 
132. Miroku Jyoho Service Co., Ltd – KOREEDA family (34%) 
133. Mitani Corporation – MITANI family (48.72%) 
134. Mitani Sekisan Co., Ltd – MITANI family (47.2%) 
135. Morishita Jintan Co., Ltd – MORISHITA family (32.8%) 
136. Muro Corporation – MURO family (38.14%) 
137. Mutoh Holdings Co., Ltd – TAKAYAMA and MUTOU families (36.76%) 
138. Nansin, KK – SAITO family (30.36%) 
139. Natoco Co., Ltd – KASUYA family (33.85%) 
140. ND Software Co., Ltd – SATO family (25.06%) 
141. Nihon Form Service Co., Ltd – YAMASHITA family (66.1%) 
142. Nikko Company – MITANI family (42.67%) 
143. Nippon Antenna Co., Ltd – TAKIZAWA family (27.9%) 
144. Nippon Information Development Co., Ltd – KOMORI family (34.66%) 
145. Nippon Primex, Inc. – NAKAGAWA family (61.5%) 
146. Nippon Systemware Co., Ltd – TADA family (52.96%) 
147. Nissei ASB Machine Co., Ltd – AOKI family (45.57%) 
148. Nitto Kohki Co., Ltd – MIKIYA family (38.89%) 
149. Nix, Inc. – AOKI and NAKAJIMA families (40.81%) 
150. Noda Corporation – NODA family (25.7%) 
151. NS Tool Co., Ltd – GOTO family (44.91%) 
152. Obara Group, Inc. – OBARA family (31.51%) 
153. Oizumi Corporation – OIZUMI family (63.27%) 
154. Okamoto Glass Co., Ltd – OKAMOTO family (30.47%) 
155. Okano Valve MFG.Co., Ltd – OKANO family (34.12%) 
156. Optoelectronics Co., Ltd – TAWARA family (28.93%) 
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157. Ozu Corporation – OZU family (30.73%) 
158. Paramount Bed Holdings Co., Ltd – KIMURA family (27.36%) 
159. Paris Miki Holdings, Inc. – TANE family (40.8%) 
160. PCA Corporation – KAWASHIMA family (38.13%) 
161. Pharmarise Holdings Corporation – OHNO family (38.1%) 
162. Poval Kogyo Co., Ltd – KANDA family (63.39%) 
163. Powdertech Co., Ltd – KIKUCHI family (36.85%) 
164. Proto Corporation – YOKOYAMA family (36.45%) 
165. Saftec Co., Ltd. – OKAZAKI family (43.37%) 
166. Sakurai, Ltd. – SAKURAI family (34.34%) 
167. Sanix, Inc. – MUNEMASA family (36.31%) 
168. Sanko Co., Ltd. – TAMURA family (50.11%) 
169. Sankyo Co., Ltd. – BUSUJIMA family (37.13%) 
170. Sankyo Frontier Co., Ltd – NAGATSUMA family (65.83%) 
171. Sanno, KK – ARAMAKI family (33.45%) 
172. Sanso Electric Co., Ltd – KURODA family (29.42%) 
173. Santec Corporation – SADAMURA and TEI families (47.91%) 
174. Sasakura Engineering Co., Ltd. – SASAKURA family (50.17%) 
175. SEC Carbon, Ltd. – OHTANI family (34.22%) 
176. Seiryo Electric Corporation – NISHIOKA family (25.54%) 
177. Semitec Corporation – ISHIZUKA family (52.51%) 
178. Shin Nippon Biomedical Laboratories, Ltd. – NAGATA family (36.77%) 
179. Shingakukai Holdings Co., Ltd. – HIRAI family (60.83%) 
180. Shobunsha Publications, Inc. – KURODA family (30.46%) 
181. SK Kaken Co., Ltd. – FUJII family (35.45%) 
182. Soiken Holdings, Inc. – KAJIMOTO family (36.36%) 
183. Somar Corporation – SOTANI family (29.2%) 
184. Square Enix Holdings Co., Ltd. – FUKUSHIMA family (27.27%) 
185. SRG Takamiya Co., Ltd. – TAKAMIYA family (49.79%) 
186. Superbag Co., Ltd. – FUKUDA family (31.24%) 
187. Suzumo Machinery Co., Ltd. – SUZUKI family (54.48%) 
188. Synclayer, Inc. – YAMAGUCHI family (29.55%) 
189. T.Hasegawa Co., Ltd. – HASEGAWA family (42.22%) 
190. Taiko Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. – SHIBATA family (26.12%) 
191. Takagi Seiko Corporation – TAKAGI and MATSUKI families (28.37%) 
192. Takamatsu Construction Group Co., Ltd. – TAKAMATSU family (43.24%) 
193. Takamisawa Co., Ltd. – TAKAMISAWA family (34.78%) 
194. Takizawa Ham Co., Ltd. – TAKIZAWA family (27.64%) 
195. Tama Home Co., Ltd. – TAMAKI family (49.5%) 
196. Technol Seven Co., Ltd. – TAKAYAMA family (49.7%) 
197. Tein, Inc. – ICHINO family (46.32%) 
198. Tenma Corporation – KANEDA and TSUKASA families (34.54%) 
199. Terasaki Electric Co., Ltd. – TERASAKI family (41.64%) 
200. Tori Holdings Co., Ltd. – FUKUMURA family (35.16%) 
201. Tose Co., Ltd. – SAITO family (33.46%) 
202. Towa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. – YOSHIDA family (43.57%) 
203. Toyo Drilube Co., Ltd. – IINO family (54.7%) 
204. Toyo Electric Corporation – MATSUO family (25.58%) 
205. Transaction Co., Ltd. – ISHIKAWA family (48.81%) 
206. Tsuchiya Holdings Co., Ltd. – TSUCHIYA family (29.97%) 
207. Waida MFG.Co., Ltd. – WAIDA family (26%) 
208. Wdb Holdings Co., Ltd – NAKANO family (51.14%) 
209. Ya-man, Ltd. – YAMAZAKI family (49.9%) 
210. Yagami, Inc. – YAGAMI and KOBAYASHI families (61.27%) 
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211. Yamada Corporation – YAMADA family (25.12%) 
212. Yamazaki Co., Ltd. – YAMAZAKI family (62.59%) 
213. Yonex Co., Ltd. – YONEYAMA family (39.3%) 
214. Yoshitake, Inc. – YAMADA family (51.54%) 
215. Yushin Precision Equipment Co., Ltd. – KOTANI family (36.63%) 
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Appendix 2: Profitability and Family Involvement in Businesses  
  (Estimated by Pool OLS Regression Model) 
The table reports the results of pool OLS regressions by excluding industry dummies and year dummies from the 
three equations mentioned in Chapter 4. The sample includes 1,492 listed Japanese firms over the 2011-2016 period 
(8,952 company-year observations). Of these 1,492 companies, 215 are family and 1,277 are nonfamily businesses. 
The dependent variable for all three columns is ROA. Independent variables are Family Ownership and Innovation. 
Control variables consist of Ln(Size), Ln(Age), Leverage, IFRS and SEC. Please refer to Chapter 3 for more detailed 
variable descriptions. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. All specifications 
include intercepts. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using 
the Huber-White sandwich estimator for variance. 
Pool OLS Regression Model 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
0.048*** 
(5.81) 
0.052*** 
(6.97) 
0.041 
(1.50) 
Family Business 
0.011*** 
(6.03) 
-0.000 
(-0.16) 
 
Family Ownership  
0.029*** 
(3.75) 
0.016 
(1.19) 
Innovation  
-0.134*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.314*** 
(-6.31) 
Founder CEO   
0.033*** 
(6.29) 
Descendant CEO   
0.017*** 
(5.22) 
Ln(Size) 
0.006*** 
(13.80) 
0.006*** 
(14.32) 
0.008*** 
(4.50) 
Ln(Age) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.00) 
-0.009*** 
(-6.95) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.94) 
Leverage 
-0.001 
(-1.49) 
-0.001 
(-1.49) 
-0.016*** 
(-8.38) 
IFRS 
0.003 
(0.74) 
0.009** 
(2.15) 
-0.041 
(-1.17) 
SEC 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.006 
(1.26) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
No. of Observations 
R2 
8,952 
0.0451 
8,952 
0.0608 
1,290 
0.1401 
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Appendix 3: Robustness Checks for Nonlinearity between Family Ownership and Profitability  
Figure 3. Augmented Component-plus-residual Plot  
(for the Least Squares Dummy Variables Model) 
 
Figure 4. Augmented Component-plus-residual Plot  
(for the Pool OLS Regression Model) 
 
